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ABSTRACT
As the conduct of international relations is changing in tone, bilateral diplomacy is
back in vogue. This trend does not leave the European continent unaffected: intergov-
ernmental bargaining is on the rise. Many EU member state capitals make good use
of their diplomatic network across the continent to better understand what other
member states aspire to achieve, and to promote their own voice within the European
system. This Egmont Paper seeks to shed conceptual clarity on the resurgence of
bilateral diplomacy in Europe. Firstly, it argues that in the absence of multilateral
successes, bilateral approaches constitute the fall-back position for structuring the
international system. Secondly, it explains in what ways bilateral networks add polit-
ical depth to intra-European relationships. Thirdly, it addresses the question whether
the revival of bilateralism in Europe inevitably undermines supranational institutions.
It concludes one must appreciates the conspicuous complementarity between the
two approaches: bilateralism and multilateralism may well alternate in prominence,
but can also reinforce one another. By way of postscript, it considers the implications
this analysis entails for Belgium’s diplomatic posture.2
INTRODUCTION
Bilateral diplomacy has never gone away, but it is again moving to the centre stage
of international relations. This trend does not leave the European continent
unaffected. The Franco-German declaration adopted at Meseberg expressed the
need “to anchor our European cooperation in a strong bilateral cooperation”.1 This
resulted in the newly signed Treaty of Aachen, which codifies inter alia an EU-wide
promise of military assistance in case of aggression (Art. 4.1) and a commitment to
harmonise financial and economic legislation on a bilateral basis (Art. 20.1).2 Regard-
less of the periodic ups-and-downs of the relationship between Paris and Berlin,
these developments are noteworthy for two different reasons.3 On the one hand, it
draws attention to the extent to which European compromises are prepared not just
by the proverbial ‘Brussels bubble’. Building European coalitions involves member
state capitals and their wide range of diplomatic instruments, including not only their
Permanent Representations to the EU but also their bilateral embassies and ministe-
rial headquarters. In this sense, bilateral diplomacy helps prepare the ground for
intergovernmental European policy processes. On the other hand, the co-existence
of Westphalian diplomatic traditions in member state capitals and the multilateral
reflex engrained in the EU’s supranational institutions cannot help but raise the
question whether sovereign states or the process of European integration constitute
the main political referent in Europe today. As such, the increased emphasis on bilat-
eral deal-making could end up substituting for integration, just as much as it can
enrich, complement and anchor European cooperation.
This Egmont Paper aims to shed some conceptual clarity on the resurgence of bilat-
eral diplomacy in Europe. The first section engages with the question what this
change of tone in diplomacy signifies within the European context. Is the shift to
transactional diplomacy merely a policy choice of today’s political leaders, or are we
observing a secular trend towards power politics in international affairs, which
cannot help but affect intra-European relations? In the absence of multilateral
successes, bilateral approaches constitute the fall-back position for structuring the
international system. The second section illuminates the logic that drives the bilat-
1 ‘Meseberg Declaration: Renewing Europe’s promises of security and prosperity’, joint declaration adopted
during the Franco-German Council of Ministers in Meseberg, 19 June 2018, available from: https://
archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/meta/startseite/meseberg-declaration-1140806.
2 ‘Traité entre la République française et la République fédérale d’Allemagne sur la coopération et l’intégra-
tion franco-allemandes’, Aachen, 22 January 2019, available from: https://www.bundesregierung.de/
resource/blob/997532/1570126/c720a7f2e1a0128050baaa6a16b760f7/2019-01-19-vertrag-von-aachen-
data.pdf.
3 For more background on the Franco-German relationship and its relevance to European integration, see
Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘L’émergence du couple franco-allemand: un marriage de raison’, Politique
étrangère, 4:2012, pp. 727-738, available from: https://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=PE_
124_0727, and Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, ‘Rethinking Franco-German relations: a historical perspective’,
Brussels: Bruegel (Policy Contribution n°29), November 2017, available from: http://bruegel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/PC-29-2017.pdf.3
THE RESURGENCE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPEeral approach. Even within the European Union, bilateral embassies continue to
provide different layers of added value, most notably in enabling direct contacts
between the leadership of foreign affairs ministries and generating convening power
abroad. As such, the bilateral network connecting European capitals provides not
just the raw foundation of European integration, but also a subtle political overlay to
the EU institutions. Far from being relics of a bygone era, bilateral diplomatic posts
and novel forms of bilateralism can add political depth to intra-European relation-
ships. The third section explores the delicate balancing act governing the revival of
bilateralism in Europe. Precisely because bilateral diplomacy is qualitatively different
from the dynamic of multilateral institutions, there exists a temptation to portray
these as mutually exclusive categories of structuring intra-European relations. Yet
the unfettered pursuit of national interests may trigger a race to the bottom that
does not further the interest of any member state. The challenge is to appreciate the
conspicuous and enduring complementarity between the two approaches. In a
Union that is composed of member states and co-governed by different institutions,
healthy bilateral exchanges can help overcome multilateral gridlock by preserving
what matters the most in Europe today: a spirit of cooperation and a perspective that
encompasses the longer term.4
THE APPEAL OF BILATERALISM IN EUROPE AND BEYOND
In recent years international relations have become increasingly transactional and
dominated by state-to-state interactions. Bilateral diplomacy is back in vogue, so to
speak. To a considerable extent, this relates to the emerging paradigm that lies
beyond the ‘post-Cold War’ period, epitomized by the retreat of the rules-based
international order, the obsolescence of the global governance system and the
return of great power rivalry.4 When considering topical policy debates in Europe,
such as Brexit, migration policies or EU leadership debates, one cannot help but
notice that the EU itself is increasingly being recast into an arena of intergovern-
mental bargaining, or even circumvented altogether by European states pursuing
bilateral deals outside the remit of the European treaties. As such, evidence
continues to mount that the turn of the tide – from multilateralism to bilateralism
and ad hoc coalitions – has set in.
Few developments symbolize the renewed appetite for bilateral deal-making as
much as the US administration led by Donald Trump. The ‘America First’ foreign
policy touted by the President of the United States espouses a worldview centred
around long-term competition amongst great powers.5 As this provides only an
inchoate response to the different ways in which other players such as China and
Russia seek to contest and revise the post-Cold War international order, this new
course in US foreign policy has provoked heated debate. Regardless of the way in
which the US-China or US-Russia relationships may evolve, the reality is that the
country which shaped the post-Cold War order the most is in the process of recali-
brating its policies in function of its own domestic imperatives.6 The earlier vision of
the world, articulated around an interlocking set of international institutions with an
ever-expanding membership, is becoming null and void.7 When the US no longer
promotes international rules and norms, in the words of Robert Kagan, “the jungle
grows back”, and the consequences thereof can be felt everywhere.8
This creeping return to transactional bartering amongst nations is not limited to the
wider world beyond the European continent. In fact, this trend could already be
observed within the European Union for several years. Ever since the dramatic days
4 See e.g. Johan Verbeke, ‘A World in Flux’, Brussels: Egmont Institute (Security Policy Brief No. 92),
November 2017, available from: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2017/11/SPB92-
Verbeke.pdf.
5 One can gather as much from the US National Security Strategy of December 2017, the 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review, and the unclassified summary of the 2018 US National Defense Strategy.
6 See e.g. Michael Pompeo, ‘Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order’,
remarks delivered at the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, 4 December 2018, available from: https://
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/12/287770.htm. Cf. also Graham Allison, ‘The Myth of the Liberal
Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018, pp. 124-133.
7 See Jean Pisani-Ferry, ‘Wincott Lecture: Can Multilateralism Survive?’, London: Chatham House, 6
November 2018, available from: www.wincott.co.uk/lectures/Pisani-Ferry%20lecture.docx
8 Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018.5
THE RESURGENCE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPEduring which policy responses to the Eurozone debt crisis were formulated, a gradual
loss of trust and concern over intra-EU solidarity – or lack thereof – has prompted a
revival of intergovernmental decision-making and flexible coalitions underpinned by
partnerships between like-minded countries.9 The negotiations between the EU-27
and the UK about the latter’s withdrawal from the Union provided a unmistakeable
warning that bilateral diplomacy ‘through the back door’ was poised for a comeback
in European affairs – even if the risk has been largely contained.10 In some respects,
a balance of power crisis is unfolding on the European continent, which apart from
Brexit is animated by US retrenchment, the rise of Germany as the EU’s economic
and political leader, and Russia’s push to recreate a sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe.11 These different factors combine into a change of mindset that is perco-
lating across different EU member state capitals and highlighting the need to rethink
their diplomatic orientations.
The trend pointing towards bilateralism is the most visible when neither the policy
responses led by the European institutions nor the search for intergovernmental
consensus bear fruit. As the poisonous debates over European migration policy
testify, the faltering of multilateral approaches breeds a need for bilateral stopgaps.
When the European Commission was not able to strike agreements with third
countries on return and readmission of irregular migrants, various EU member states
started negotiating such agreements on a bilateral basis. By including quintessen-
tially sovereign matters, such as intelligence, military and judicial cooperation,
individual member states have been more successful in delivering results than the
European Commission. In turn, third countries across North Africa have been able to
bargain up the price of their cooperation significantly. When the European Council
was not able to come to agreement on migration policy reform, the appeal of bilat-
eral deals between EU member states proved irresistible.12 Even if such agreements
are light in terms of their policy content, the message is clear: when European agree-
ment is not within reach, bilateral deals constitute a useful fall-back option. Similar
dynamics can be observed with respect to the return of economic protectionism
within the single market. The debates within the Transport, Telecommunications and
9 Cf. Jozef Janning, ‘The roots of coalitions: Like-mindedness among EU member states’, Berlin: European
Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2018, available from: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_
eu28survey_coalitions_like_mindedness_among_eu_member_states. In this regard it is also common to
refer to a drift towards a ‘Europe à la carte’. See e.g. Bart Sturtewagen, ‘Neen zeggen tegen Europa’, De
Standaard, 16 November 2018.
10 This even prompted the European Commission to warn EU member states of the risk of engaging in bilat-
eral discussions with the UK; see Jacopo Barigazzi and Charlie Cooper, ‘Brussels issues démarche on alleged
British divide-and-rule tactic’, Politico, 4 September 2018, available from: https://www.politico.eu/article/
brexit-michel-barnier-dominic-raab-brussels-warns-diplomats-against-uks-brexit-divide-and-rule-scheme/.
Cf. also Kristin Haugevik, ‘Diplomacy through the back door: Norway and the bilateral route to EU decision-
making’, Global Affairs, 3 (3), 2017, pp. 277-291.
11 See Luis Simon, ‘The Spectre of a Westphalian Europe?’, London: Royal United Services Institute (Whitehall
Paper 90), 2018.
12 Deutsche Welle, ‘Chancellor Angela Merkel advocates bilateral, trilateral deals over migrants to EU’, 24 June
2018, available from: https://www.dw.com/en/chancellor-angela-merkel-advocates-bilateral-trilateral-
deals-over-migrants-to-eu/a-44372773.6
THE RESURGENCE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPEEnergy Council on the Mobility Package constitute a case in point in which individual
member states seek to add bilateral tweaks to EU legislation.
Inside the sprawling network of intra-European bilateral relationships, the Franco-
German relationship remains the most important one in setting the tone of the
debate. It is hard to ponder meaningful EU-reform that is not driven by the so-called
Franco-German engine. The way in which the European sovereign debt crisis devel-
oped over the past years has offered a sharp illustration how Paris and Berlin
together shape collective EU responses. At the same time, Berlin is finding itself in
the position of kingmaker at the middle of the bilateral European network. Soon
after coming into power, President Emmanuel Macron outlined his vision for Europe
in a series of speeches, most notably at the Sorbonne and at the Charlemagne prize-
giving ceremony. Yet all his eloquence could not hide the fact that the final authority
to arbitrate on policy proposals has shifted to the German government and the
Bundestag. Similarly, it is noticeable that Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte chose to
deliver his major policy address on the future of the EU in Berlin.13 In doing so, he
could rely on support from the so-called new Hanseatic League in advocating fiscal
responsibility.14 As such, a novel pattern is developing in which different EU member
states seek to woo German policy circles as a new mechanism for exercising influ-
ence in the EU policy arena in Brussels. Equally noteworthy is the fact that the
composition of intra-EU coalitions is constantly in flux, changing from one policy
domain to the next.
The return of transactional deal-making amongst the different power centres on the
European continent raises memories of a more distant past, in which the interests of
smaller countries were not always respected. The Community method was precisely
conceived as a mechanism, in the words of Jean Monnet, “to seek a solution to the
problems themselves, instead of trading temporary advantages”.15 Yet the trend
towards bilateralism cannot be wished away. Even as bilateral diplomacy comes with
risk and uncertainty, the international trend must be properly understood before
one can aspire to shape and influence it. Paradoxically, bilateral diplomatic posts
constitute the most important asset to do so.
13 Mark Rutte, ‘Underpromise and overdeliver: fulfilling the promise of Europe’, speech at the Bertelsmann
Stiftung, Berlin, 2 March 2018, available from: https://www.government.nl/documents/speeches/2018/
03/02/speech-by-the-prime-minister-of-the-netherlands-mark-rutte-at-the-bertelsmann-stiftung-berlin.
14 See Jim Brunsden and Michael Acton, ‘The Hanseatic League 2.0’, Financial Times, 7 November 2017.
15 Jean Monnet, ‘A Ferment of Change’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (3), 1963, p. 206.7
THE ADDED VALUE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC 
NETWORKS
A sovereign state maintains a diplomatic network in order to help it understand and
shape the international environment in which it find itself. Such a network of embas-
sies and representations constitutes the nervous system at the heart of foreign
policy-making. Provided that diplomatic posts reach critical mass individually, the
network they form will appreciate the constantly changing character of international
relations the earliest, and constitute an instrument for pro-actively influencing the
trend in line with the national interest. Bilateral embassies represent the oldest
foundation of diplomatic networks. Their attention and activities span across
multiple policy domains, from international security and trade to cooperation on
domestic matters. For analytical purposes, this section distinguishes between the
five functions that such embassies perform, not only outside but also inside the
European context. Focusing on the latter helps one appreciate the co-existence of
European institutions and bilateral networks in connecting the peoples of EU
member states. While these functions only represent ideal-types, it is useful to
distinguish between them for the sake of analytical clarity.
The first function of an embassy is to alert one’s own country to relevant trends and
signals that can be picked up in the host country. Embassies report on all significant
political and economic developments in a way that complements media reporting.
By drawing on frequent contacts with the host government, parliamentary commu-
nities, business circles, thinktanks and NGOs, embassies can add greater depth to the
analysis of what is going on in any particular country. By virtue of their institutional
memory, they are able to concentrate on long-term trends and help inform govern-
ment communication on that basis. Within the EU, bilateral Ambassadors are not
competent for EU affairs, yet they do alert their respective capitals to the domestic
dynamics within different member states. Even inside the thick institutional web of
European integration, bilateral embassies continue to provide a critical role in
monitoring political developments across the continent.
The second and corollary function of an embassy is to represent one’s country in the
host country. Traditionally this includes the transmission of official communication
between governments as well as the ceremonial aspects of representation. Precisely
because bilateral embassies are permanently embedded within the diplomatic tissue
of a member state’s capital, they can help communicate a member state’s EU policy
positions, not only towards the host government but also directly towards relevant
segments of society. While EU policy is formally produced in Brussels, many EU
member states make good use of their bilateral embassies to ‘prepare the terrain’,
i.e. by patiently explaining national policy positions and building support for these in
different capitals. In EU member state capitals other than Brussels, the network of8
THE RESURGENCE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPEbilateral ambassadors tends to form a secondary transmission belt for intergovern-
mental debates across the Union. Such interactions may lack the policy detail
provided by the Permanent Representations in Brussels, but they do engage wider
and more diverse audiences.
The third function of embassies is to support bilateral political and economic negoti-
ations between home and host governments. The days in which ambassadors
received wide discretionary authorities from their home government to negotiate
quasi-independently are of course long gone. But even in an era of constant govern-
ment-to-government contacts at all possible levels, embassies continue to serve as
the institutional repositories for such negotiations and other forms of advancing
national interests, often of a commercial or national security-related nature. Even if
national ministers and their departments are increasingly in the driving seat of such
negotiations and reaching out to their bilateral counterparts, the relevant embassies
can assist with the targeting of key messages and strengthen policy consistency vis-
à-vis host countries.
Fourthly, most embassies also feature a consular function. They serve as civil affairs
administration for the local expat community (issuing identity papers, residence
certificates, civil status etc.) and act as a go-to point of contact for visa applications
and other relevant queries from foreigners. In this sense, a bilateral embassy and its
supporting consular offices serve as de facto commune for citizens living abroad,
turning their ambassadors into part-time mayors of small- to medium-sized villages.
From the point of view of most citizens outside Brussels, the probability of coming
into contact with a bilateral ambassador is much higher than that of interacting
directly with the EU institutions. Even if not this function is not as politically salient,
this proximity to citizens strengthens the societal roots of the intra-European diplo-
matic network.
The fifth and final function of any embassy is to provide ‘convening power’ to one’s
own national community active in a specific country. Embassies provide support to
business entrepreneurs, corporate groups, universities, civil society organisations
and all other entities seeking to nurture or expand their international activities. The
local ambassador might provide ideas and guidance on how to go about setting up
contacts, make introductions or suggest whom to talk to, sponsor or host a promo-
tion event etc. Within the framework of the EU – especially in the case of neigh-
bouring countries – such convening power might not constitute a critical prerequi-
site, as the obstacles to the cooperation and conduct of business are relatively minor.
At the same time, these EU member states tend to be each other’s most important
trading partners. The sheer density of bilateral relations does not obviate the need
for embassy support; it rather strengthens the case for making such support as
efficient and professional as possible.9
THE RESURGENCE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPEIf there is anything in particular worth noting about intra-European bilateral diplo-
macy, then it is the observation that the evolving role of bilateral embassies goes
hand in hand with novel forms of bilateralism, such as staff secondments within
member states’ capitals, visiting or ‘roving’ ambassadors, and/or co-location of
diplomatic infrastructure.16 The high degree of diplomatic trust amongst EU member
states has translated into an increased acceptability of posting diplomatic staff
directly into the ministry of another member state for ensuring the follow-up of
specific dossiers – a practice initiated by the French and German foreign ministries in
1986. In addition, different European capitals have also taken to designating visiting
or roving ambassadors that are accredited to (but not based in) another member
state, or alternatively, based in one member state but responsible for several states
in the same region. This practice, as first developed by Sweden, has become instru-
mental in reducing cost, compressing the overhead of the intra-European diplomatic
network, and customizing different forms of representation.17
When taking these different functions together, it is clear that a network of bilateral
embassies remains the most fundamental tool in the conduct of international
relations. Due to the existence of the EU, the role of intra-European bilateral network
has evolved considerably, yet bilateral diplomacy remains an important instrument
in the service of the European policies member states choose to pursue. Bilateral
embassies feed the analysis of what is going in all other member states, and help
enable the member state capital to articulate its policy preferences not only in
Brussels, but also in all other national capitals. In that sense, bilateral diplomacy
conducted by ministry headquarters and embassies alike both precedes and supple-
ments the policy discussions in Brussels, most notably by exploring possible coali-
tions and influencing key stakeholders in different capitals. At the same time, it bears
emphasis that bilateral embassies alone cannot possibly suffice for allowing the EU’s
single market to function, or for defending common European interests that derive
from the EU’s exclusive competences, such as monetary or commercial policy. The
question, therefore, is how this bilateral system interacts with the institutional
dimension of the EU.
16 For a more extensive discussion, see Arjan Uilenreef, ‘Alternatives to the Resident Embassy: Intra-EU Diplo-
matic Networks in the Twenty-first Century’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 25, pp. 356-377.
17 Cf. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ‘A world-class foreign service’, Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet
(SOU 2011:21), March 2011, available from https://www.government.se/legal-documents/2011/03/sou-
201121/ (also q.i. Uilenreef, op. cit., p. 365).10
BALANCING BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL 
APPROACHES IN THE EU
If the resurgence of bilateral diplomacy constitutes a powerful international trend, it
raises thorny questions for the political architecture of the European continent. After
all, bilateral diplomacy has in the past occasionally been portrayed as something that
was superseded by the process of European integration – even if the residual value
added provided by bilateral embassies explains itself easily enough.18 The renewed
emphasis on transactional deal-making amongst member state governments can be
portrayed as evidence of a reduced emphasis on supranational approaches. It is
arguably also in keeping with the upswing of identity politics within EU member
states. The key issue is whether such bilateral impulses account for the European
continent sliding back towards a Westphalian model, or whether member states are
resorting to their full diplomatic toolkit for re-anchoring the European construction
at a time when the international system is rapidly evolving. The distinction between
these two competing models may strike one either as exaggerated, or as splitting
hairs. The principal take-away, however, is that the bilateral and the multilateral
logic, just like intergovernmental and supranational models of EU integration, can
reinforce one another in times of international stress.
A negative model for describing the comeback of bilateralism would suggest that the
European project has itself entered a state of fragmentation and decay. Whether this
premise is an analytical or a prescriptive one is irrelevant. Whether by fear or by
desire, member states find themselves tempted or obliged to revitalize and
strengthen their sovereign toolkit in order to deal with an increasingly anarchical
environment. This logic highlights the instrumental value of their national diplo-
matic, defence and intelligence apparatus, as these would constitute the main instru-
ments for dealing with various scenarios of EU erosion or outright collapse.19 In this
model, bilateral relationships within the European continent and beyond account for
a conscious investment in hedging against profoundly negative scenarios of
European disintegration accompanying the decomposition of the rules-based order.
Most fundamentally, this pattern also relates to the decreasing credibility of the US
security umbrella.20 The negativity of these scenarios derives from the observation
18 Cf. Øivind Bratberg, ‘Bilateral diplomacy in an integrated Europe: The co-existence of institutional orders?’,
in: Morten Egeberg, ed., Institutional Dynamics and the Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe,
Mannheim: University of Mannheim (CONNEX Network of Excellence Report Series Nr. 03), pp. 533-561.
19 For an extensive discussion of how such scenarios might come about, see Ian Kearns, Collapse: Europe after
the European Union, London: Biteback Publishing 2018.
20 Cf. Hal Brands, Eric S. Edelman and Thomas G. Mahnken, Credibility Matters: Strengthening American
Deterrence in an Age of Geopolitical Turmoil, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess-
ments, 2018, available from: https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Credibility_Paper_FINAL_
format.pdf.11
THE RESURGENCE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPEthat few would label the return to a Westphalian system as a choice for continued
stability and prosperity on the European continent.
In turn, a positive model for appreciating the renewed emphasis on bilateral diplo-
macy is premised on the proposition that it will enable the European construction to
endure in an era of increased stress. The value of European integration is not put into
question: all European citizens benefit from the international clout and regulatory
influence that the single market provides. Yet this model recognizes that there are
limits to extending EU policy competences and technocratic governance. Given that
the European construction is a product of member states just as much as one of
shared institutions, bilateral diplomacy was never going to fade away. Instead, its
comeback is rather to be understood as an investment to re-anchor European
cooperation as a network spanning across all member states. As such, the task of
striving towards consensus is not simply delegated to Brussels, but rather supported
and defended by the full apparatus of all member states. Being strong as a Union, in
other words, requires strong member states to begin with.
Irrespective of which model one prefers for analysing the current state of the
European construction and the accompanying interest for bilateral diplomacy, the
key is that this constitutes no binary choice. By definition, all instruments of state-
craft can be put to the pursuit of constructive as well as destructive policy agendas.
Assertive bilateral diplomacy has the potential of both undermining and strength-
ening the EU. It risks hollowing out the supranational dimension of integration, just
as it promises to defend the process of integration by all available means. Particularly
relevant is the notion that if the European project is under siege by a return of great
power competition, it cannot be defended by soft power, lofty rhetoric and EU exclu-
sive competences alone. When bilateral diplomacy is the name of the game, member
states cannot avoid being pulled along and respond in kind. For every member state,
this implies a delicate balancing act that maintains an equilibrium between the
advantages that EU membership entail and the high cost of developing alternatives.
Seen in this light, many capitals approach intra-European bilateral diplomacy as a
complement instead of an alternative to EU integration. It helps each of them better
understand what all the other member states most desire and aspire to, and
promote their own voice within the European system. In that sense, intra-European
bilateral diplomacy is not only relevant in times of stress, but would be continue
required even when the Union is functioning well, precisely because supranational
institutions and diplomatic networks can reinforce and legitimise each other.12
CONCLUSION
The renewed prominence of bilateral diplomacy represents a symptom rather than
a cause of change in the international system. If the preference for bilateral deal-
making signals a recalibration of the rules-based international order, then the latter
process is explained by the ongoing redistribution of political, economic and military
power away from the West. This cannot help but have profound consequences for
the architecture of European integration, of which the historical foundations are part
and parcel of Cold War and post-Cold War dynamics. The question what lies beyond
the post-Cold War paradigm that is now crumbling, is one that all European countries
face together – even if they have to figure out their own answer before comparing
to what extent these answers converge.
The institutional stress the EU is currently experiencing, is related not just to the
turbulence in the wider world, but also to the coming to terms with the conse-
quences of the decisions that were taken a generation ago. In particular, the long-
term political impact of German reunification, monetary union and eastern enlarge-
ment are only now coming into full view. As a result of these fateful decisions,
European integration acquired much more binding characteristics in the economic
realm, and has implied a geographical redistribution of political influence eastwards.
It is only now, when the post-Maastricht EU acquis is put under intense pressure by
internal and external factors alike, that all EU member states are forced to explore
which of these achievements are durable and sustainable, and what features may
need amending – either by devising national stopgaps or by contemplating changes
to the EU acquis.
The salience of intra-European bilateral diplomacy resides in the fact that it allows
the member state capitals to test and probe the remits of what is possible and desir-
able within the European political arena. Such bilateral endeavours cannot possibly
hope to offer a substitute for competent EU institutions – that is, not without giving
up on much of the added value these provide. But they can help anchor the process
of integration for weathering the gusts of political turbulence that occur today in
domestic as well as in international politics. It is no coincidence that those EU
member states that are most interested and best positioned for shaping the future
course of European integration, most notably France, Germany, the Netherlands and
the UK, have all maintained extensive bilateral networks and constantly seek to make
good use of it in promoting their policy preferences. The ongoing Brexit negotiations
offer a good indication that the single market achievements are being fiercely
protected, whilst the protracted debates about migration policy or defence policy
suggest that major leaps in integration are not forthcoming anytime soon.
In sum, the resurgence of bilateral diplomacy in Europe tells little about the future
direction of European integration per se. As it constitutes a mere symptom of a13
THE RESURGENCE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPEchanging international atmospherics, it represents both a threat and an opportunity
to the EU as we know it today. Pessimists predicting the imminent demise of the EU
would do well to remember that the European project was itself not born in the most
propitious of circumstances, just as perennial optimists who believe that a federal
Europe is just around the corner would do well to remember that previous genera-
tions of optimists have been occasionally mistaken – sometimes rather badly so. If
anything, the analysis above suggests that the search for a new paradigm governing
European affairs beyond the post-Cold War period has started in earnest. In times
like these, those member states and European institutions who are ready to embrace
new models are perhaps the most likely to start from pole position in shaping
whatever comes next.14
POSTSCRIPT: IMPLICATIONS FOR BELGIUM
What does this analysis imply for Belgium, one of the founding EU member states
with high aspirations for the European project? The trend described in the preceding
pages arguably runs counter to deeply engrained Belgian preferences on how the
international system should function. After all, ever since 1945 Belgian diplomacy
has sought to promote the construction of multilateral institutions, starting with
what we know today as the Benelux, the UN, NATO and the EU. This new drift
towards bilateral diplomacy within the European construction as well as beyond
does not sit easily with the Belgian perspective on foreign or European affairs. In
addition, the trend raises uncomfortable questions about the state in which
Belgium’s bilateral network finds itself in at present, not only when it comes to
advancing economic interests, but also with respect to its fundamental role as one of
the key departments providing for national security. Can the Belgian foreign policy
community avoid coming to terms with the international environment that is in the
process of emerging?
This debate can only start from an evaluation of today’s situation. While many other
EU member states have continued investing in bilateral diplomacy within the EU
framework, budget cuts have forced the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to curtail
the reach of its diplomatic network.21 Over the past years, the number of Belgian
embassies (i.e. not counting permanent representations, consulates and develop-
ment cooperation bureaus) has been reduced from 89 to 78.22 Most significantly,
Belgium has no embassy anymore in seven EU member states, namely Cyprus (now
provided for from Athens), the three Baltic states (provided for from Helsinki, Stock-
holm and Warsaw, respectively), Malta (provided for from Rome), Slovakia and
Slovenia (both provided for from Vienna). Moreover, many of the remaining Belgian
intra-EU embassies are thinly stretched, often relying on an ‘Ambassador plus one’
or ‘Ambassador plus two’ structure of diplomatic personnel, and struggle to meet the
21 The contrast between Belgium and its neighbours is striking. The Dutch government has already announced
additional means for its diplomatic apparatus, and explicitly refers to the increased prominence of bilateral
diplomacy in Europe to strengthen not only its Permanent Representation to the EU, but also its embassies
in Belgrado, Berlin, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Dublin, London, Madrid, Paris, Pristina, Sarajevo, Skopje,
Tirana, Vienna and Zaghreb; see Stef Blok, ‘Brief aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer: Uitbreiding en
versterking postennet’, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 8 Oktober 2018, available from:
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/10/08/kamerbrief-
uitbreiding-en-versterking-postennet/kamerbrief-uitbreiding-en-versterking-postennet.pdf. Similarly, the
push to nurture and sharpen the worldwide reach of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has started, see
e.g. Laurence Daziano, ‘Pour une réforme majeure du Quai d’Orsay’, La Tribune, 7 September 2018, avail-
able from: https://www.latribune.fr/opinions/tribunes/pour-une-reforme-majeure-du-quai-d-orsay-
789668.html.
22 Dirk Achten (v.u.), ‘Jaarverslag 2016’, Brussel: FOD Buitenlandse Zaken, Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikke-
lingssamenwerking, available from: https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/jaarvers-
lag_2016_buitenlandse_zaken.pdf.15
THE RESURGENCE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPEcritical mass threshold.23 It is true that Belgian federal diplomacy is frequently
accompanied and supplemented by regional diplomatic representations, export
promotion authorities and the network of defence attachés, which add value to the
diplomatic network too. Yet having said so, the combined efforts of different layers
of government remain limited even when optimally coordinated, which itself
requires resources too.
One should also be clear about the consequences of the present situation. Should
this trend be allowed to persist, it is likely to render the Belgian government’s under-
standing about what is going on inside other EU member states increasingly shallow,
and make it less and less able to serve and further the interests of its own citizens
and taxpayers. In fact, the extent to which the return of bilateral diplomacy has
largely gone unnoticed by the wider Belgian audience proves a case in point. By
neglecting or closing Belgian antennae abroad, the risk of being caught unaware by
adverse developments on the European and the wider international stage increases
exponentially. On the upside, Belgium derives an important boost from the double
role of Brussels as national as well as European capital. Yet receiving many European
visitors can only offer a partial substitute for a network generating diplomatic influ-
ence abroad.
For an EU member state like Belgium, having invested so much in European integra-
tion, it may be counter-intuitive to engage in the precarious balancing act between
bilateral and multilateral approaches outlined earlier. Precisely because European
disintegration constitutes the geopolitical nightmare scenario, it may be tempting to
avoid such exercises altogether. Yet can Belgium truly deliver on its European
vocation – to be in the cockpit of the EU, to use a popular phrase – if it does not
constantly seek to understand and shape what is going on in other EU capitals? More
bluntly put, is it prudent policy for Belgium not to engage with an established inter-
national trend? Recognizing the need for investing in the bilateral network is there-
fore equal to accept the reality that the Belgian sovereign state apparatus cannot be
hollowed out any further without adverse consequences for all citizens – relating to
their economic wellbeing as well as their long-term security. It is worth noting that a
hollow diplomatic network severely curtails convening power abroad, whereas
substantial influence in an interconnected world is premised on the need to involve
all departments of government (federal as well as regional), the private sector and
civil society.
If the Belgian government wishes to reinvigorate its European policy and interna-
tional posture, it needs to consider reinvesting in its diplomatic network, both within
and beyond the European continent. Under present circumstances, bilateral
dialogue with Berlin, Paris, the Hague and Luxembourg may constitute a more effec-
23 It is worth noting that Belgium and the Netherlands both benefit from exchanging selected diplomatic
reports and sharing some facilities overseas for making ends meet.16
THE RESURGENCE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPEtive means for shaping events than relying on the traditional approach of simply
supporting the European Commission. As an aside, it is worth noting that the
European Commission’s representation to Belgium is becoming an important bilat-
eral partner in its own right, as all member states are coming to appreciate in the
context of the European Semester. In addition, the relationship with London and
with all other capitals deserves diplomatic attention, too. Irrespective of the
outcome of the Brexit negotiation, the UK will remain a neighbouring country, and in
the EU-27 context one cannot help build consensus by talking only to those member
states one already knows best. Developing a sustained dialogue with Northern,
Central and Southern European member states will therefore be a precondition for
articulating a full-bodied European policy. In that sense, Belgian diplomacy needs to
be strengthened for ensuring and promoting the interests of all Belgian citizens, just
as much as for supporting the European project as a whole.17
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